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7. What Do We Know About the Future Changes 
in the Proportions of Children and Elderly in 
Europe? 1 
Was wissen wir uber zukunftige 
Veranderungen in den Anteilen von Kindern 
und alteren Henschen in Europa? 
Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag liefert die ersten probabilistischen Bevolkerungsprognosen for die 
Europaische Union. Die Annahmen zur zukiinftigen Fertilitat, Mortalitat und 
Migration wurden im wesendichen von Eurostar iibernommen. Es wurde der am 
IIASA entwickelte, auf strukrurierter Expertenmeinung basierende, probabilistische 
Ansatz verwendet. Dabei wurde zusatzlich angenommen, daB die von Eurostar 
definierten lntervalle 90% bzw. 67% aller moglichen zukiinftigen Pfade in den drei 
Komponenten abdecken. Die Resultate von 1000 Simulationen zeigen iiberzeu-
gend, daB ein ganz substantielles Altern der Europaischen Bevolkerung so gut wie 
sicher ist und nicht als ein Szenario mit unbekannter Wahrscheinlichkeit abgetan 
werden kann. Bis zum Jahr 2050 wird der Anteil der iiber 60-jahrigen Menschen in 
Europa voraussichtlich um rund 60% zunehmen, wahrend der Anteil der unter 
20-jahrigen um 20% abnimmt. Dieser Trend bei der alteren Bevolkerung ist mit 
weniger Unsicherheiten behaftet als die zukiinftige Zahl der jiingeren Menschen. 
Abstract 
This report presents the first probabilistic population forecasts for the European Union 
following the approach of expert based probabilistic projections as developed at IIASA. 
The central, high and low assumptions used for foture fertility, mortality and migration 
correspond essentially to those of Eurostat. These high-low ranges were assumed to cover 
67 percent and 90 percent of all foture paths, depending on the model. The results show 
convincingly that very significant population aging over the coming decades is not just a 
scenario of unknown probability, but is practically a certainty. By 2050 the proportion 
above age 60 is likely to increase by about 60 percent whereas the proportion of children 
and youngsters will fall by about 20 percent. This trend is much less uncertain for the 
elderly than for the young. 
This paper is a revised and expanded version of the keynote address delivered at the European 
Symposium ,,A Society for All Ages" organised by the Austrian EU-presidency and the European 
Commission in Vienna, Austria, 12 October 1998. le received financial support from the Austrian 
Ministry of Social Affairs. 
When we speak of Europe, we usually do not think of it in a geophysical sense as a 
specific mass of land, but rather in a social, cultural and economic sense. It is the 
population of Europe that constitutes most of our interest in Europe. This 
European population, however, is not an amorphous and homogeneous mass. It is 
structured according to several important criteria. In Europe, usually the first fac-
tors that come to mind are linguistics, culture and national divides. We may also 
think in terms of place of residence, employment status and social class. In focusing 
on these structures we sometimes tend to forget about the two most fundamental 
structures of any population, namely age and gender. Gender has recently received 
increasing attention, and most governments as well as the European Commission 
have created special bodies to study gender issues and promote equal opportunities 
for men and women. The age dimension has not yet received similar attention. But 
since we are expecting very significant changes in the age distribution of Europe's 
population - a rapidly increasing number of elderly together with a shrinking num-
ber of children - the age dimension of the population structure and all associated 
issues of inter-generational relations are likely to receive increasing attention in the 
future. 
Why should one be interested in age? At the individual level this sounds like a 
silly question. Whether you are one year old, 10 years old, 40 years old or 80 years 
old is probably the single most important determinant of how you feel and live, 
what you do, and what you still expect from life. It is directly related to the process 
of socialisation, development of skills, body strength, maturing, and last but not 
least, the remaining average life expectancy. On the level of society this question is 
less obvious. Does it make any difference whether half of the population is below 
age 15, as in some developing countries, or whether half is above age 40, as is alrea-
dy the case in several European countries? It is obvious that it makes a difference in 
demand for schools and for homes for the elderly. It is also evident that it signifi-
cantly affects the balance of payments in a pay-as-you-go pension system in which 
those who are gainfully employed today pay for those who are entitled to retire-
ment benefits. And it is expected to also have significant implications for the labour 
market. But one may even go beyond that and speculate about changing consumer 
demand and changing cultural preferences. It is also evident, that changing family 
structures are intimately related with both the reasons for population ageing (due 
to low fertility rates) and its consequences in terms of family networks. More gene-
rations are alive at the same time, while simultaneously there are fewer siblings. 
These changing quantitative relationships are likely to also affect the quality of the 
relationships. 
Focusing here on these demographic relationships is not to say that they are 
necessarily the most important changes that we will see in Europe over the next 
decades, but they will without doubt present significant structural framework con-
ditions that will affect many aspects of life and that can be forecast over several 
decades with relatively high certainty. 
7.1 Population Dynamics 
As compared to other social and economic factors, demographic trends are very sta-
ble and have a great momentum. For this reason population dynamics can be pro-
jected with greater accuracy over a longer time span. Of course, such projections 
are not absolutely certain because human behaviour is not purely mechanistic and 
there can be unforeseen disasters. But since most of the people that will live in 
2015 are already alive today, we know with a high probability what the age structu-
re of the labour force is likely to be in that year. 
Future population size and age structures are determined by the present age 
structure and the future trends in the three basic demographic components fertility 
(birth rate), mortality (death rate) and migration. Any change in the population 
must operate through one of these three facrors. But even rather rapid changes in 
one of the factors may take quite long to impact on the total population due to the 
great inertia of population dynamics. If, for instance, smaller and smaller cohorts of 
women are entering the childbearing ages, even a possible increase in the mean 
number of children per woman may not lead to an increase in the total number of 
births. Similarly, the ,,baby boom" of the 1960s (and not a discontinuity in life 
expectancy gains) is the main reason why we expect the proportion above age 60 to 
increase sharply after 2020. 
The fact that there are only three factors to be considered in population projec-
tion does not necessarily make the task easier, because the projection of each of the 
factors is difficult and associated with significant uncertainties. Even the future of 
mortality, which traditionally has been considered the most stable demographic 
trend with steady improvements over the years, has recently become more uncer-
tain. Over the last 50 years, life expectancy in Western Europe has increased by 
about 10 years, implying an average gain of two years per decade. Despite this sig-
nificant gain that has surpassed all expectations expressed in earlier years, most sta-
tistical offices producing projections assume a slowing of improvements over the 
coming years, in some cases even constant life expectancy. Eurostar assumes, in the 
medium projection, a gain in life expectancy at birth of about three years over a 
period of 20 years (European Commission 1998). But there is increasing scientific 
uncertainty about limits to human longevity and consequently about the future 
gains still to be expected (Vaupel and Lundstrom 1996). In contrast to the traditio-
nally dominating view that we are already very close to such a limit (actually, the 
assumed limits are being constantly moved upward by projectors as real gains sur-
pass their expectations; Bucht 1996) alternative views suggest that such limits (if 
they even exist at all) might be well above 100 years. This scientific uncertainty 
about the future trends in old-age mortality also needs to be reflected in the popu-
lation projections. 
Fertility is the most influential of the three demographic components under a 
longer time horizon. Changes in fertility not only impact on the number of child-
ren but also on that of the grandchildren, etc. For this reason relatively small chan-
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ges in fertility may have very significant consequences on future population size 
and age structure. Despite its significance we know rather little about the future 
trends of fertility in Europe. The history since World War II does not help us anti-
cipate the future trend. During the so-called baby boom of the early 1960s most 
Western European countries had period fertility rates of above 2.5 children per 
woman. This was followed by a rapid fertility decline during the 1970s, bringing 
the Western European average down to about 1.6. Since then we have seen diver-
ging trends, typically at levels well below replacement fertility. The most significant 
fertility declines were found in the Mediterranean countries, with Italy and Spain 
having below 1.2 children per woman. There are also significant regional differenti-
als within countries. A further uncertainty is due to the fact that it is not clear to 
what degree these trends are caused by ,,timing" changes, i.e., a postponement of 
births, and how far they are reflective of the lifetime fertility of younger generations 
of European women (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). There is no clear scientific para-
digm to adequately anticipate future reproductive behaviour. The notion of a 
,,second demographic transition" has been suggested to capture these trends, but it 
does not say where and when the endpoint of this transition should be reached 
(Van de Kaa 1987; Cliquet 1991) . For this reason, again, population projections 
need to reflect the uncertainty through a range of fertility assumptions. 
Migration is the most volatile of the three demographic components. The 
number of people entering or leaving a country can change from one year to the 
next due to political events or the enforcement of new legislation. The past 10 years 
have witnessed great ups and downs in European migration levels. The problem 
with projecting migration trends is not only the intrinsic difficulty of foreseeing 
such political events, but also the fact that net migration is the result of two partly 
independent streams (in-migration and out-migration) and that they depend on 
the conditions in both the sending and receiving countries. In this respect projec-
tions can do little more than demonstrate the impacts of alternative net-migration 
scenarios (Lutz 1993) . 
7.2 Probabilistic Population Projections for the EU 
Policies to manage the future and meet the demographic challenges require the best 
available information about future trends. The standard way to project the future 
population path, which is considered most likely by experts, is a well-established 
methodology, the so-called cohort component method. The more difficult issue is 
how to deal with uncertainty in future demographic trends. As indicated above 
there are significant uncertainties associated with all three components, fertility, 
mortality and migration. The usual way is to produce different scenarios or vari-
ants, which combine alternative fertility, mortality and migration assumptions. But 
here the users of projections are not informed about the likelihood of the different 
scenarios, whether they are very unlikely ,,horror scenarios" that may be dismissed 
~ .. :,~ ,::~~ :~~~ 
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immediately, or whether they are highly realistic trends that should be taken 
seriously. Only probabilistic projections can answer these questions. 
Expert-based probabilistic projections are a rather recent methodological deve-
lopment (at IIASA, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in 
Austria) and here we present the first such projections for the European Union 
after earlier applications to Austria (Hanika, Lutz and Scherbov 1997), Germany 
(Lutz and Scherbov 1998), and 13 major world regions (Lutz, Sanderson and 
Scherbov 1997). 
The basic idea of the chosen approach to probabilistic population projection lies 
in a process in which a group of experts defines assumptions about the likely pro-
portion of all possible future paths in fertility, mortality and migration that fall wit-
hin a given range of high and low values for each of the components. Since the 
methodology is extensively documented elsewhere (Lutz, Goldstein and Prinz 
1996; Lutz and Scherbov 1997; Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 1996, 1999) we will 
not go into any details here. Assuming a normal distribution (the method also 
works for other distributions if there are reasons to choose them) typical assumpti-
ons are that 67 percent or 90 percent lie within the specified range of high and low 
values. Given the symmetric nature of the normal distribution the average of the 
high and low values (the central or baseline assumption) is also the assumption of 
highest probability. The tails of the distribution also include extreme assumptions 
with low probability. Based on these three distributions a large number of simulati-
ons (1,000 in the case of these projections) is performed by randomly drawing fer-
tility, mortality and migration paths from the distributions and combining them in 
independent cohort-component projections. The resulting distributions of popula-
tion size, sizes of specific age groups, etc., can then be presented numerically or gra-
phically through selected fractiles as shown below. 
The projections presented here for the whole European Union (treated as one 
region) are based on the assumptions as produced by Eurostar. There three scenari-
os have been defined to 2015 for each of the three components (European 
Commission 1998): Total Fertility Rate: 1.41 (low), 1.64 (baseline), 1.92 (high); 
Life Expectancy female: 81.5 (low), 83.1 (baseline), 84.4 (high); male: 75.0 (low), 
77.2 (baseline), 79.2 (high) . The assumed annual migration balances for 2010-14 
are 398,000 (low), 592,000 (baseline), 788,000 (high) . For each of the compo-
nents specific paths have been defined between the base year 1995 and the target 
year 2015. For the extension to 2030 and 2050, which are presented in this study, 
constant rates have been assumed. Due to this correspondence of assumptions the 
median of the probabilistic projections is indeed identical to the baseline scenario 
of Eurostar. However, the quantitative uncertainty intervals around the median are 
new. For the set of projections presented here, they are based on the additional 
assumption that 90 percent of all future fertility and mortality paths fall between 
the stated high and low values. For migration only 67 percent has been assumed 
due to higher perceived uncertainty. Since annual migration flows are much more 
dependent on short-term political events than fertility and mortality, which are 
-11)~ 
6 I F SC H R I F TEt RiJ ~ 
~·~ fI'__-; .:~:.~ 
more difficult to predict, a significantly high degree of uncertainty has been assu-
med for migration. A sensitivity analysis of these assumptions will be described 
later. 
Figure 1 shows the results of the probabilistic projections for the total populati-
on of the current 15 member states of the EU up to 2050. The median of these 
projections shows a slight increase from the current 375 million inhabitants of the 
EU to around 390 million in 2020, followed by a moderate decrease to 377 milli-
on (about the present level) by 2050. Hence population decline is not a likely 
medium term prospect for the European Union. The figure also shows the fractiles 
of the estimated uncertainty distribution. The inner 20 percent are represented by 
the black area, while the inner 60 percent are shown by the dark shaded area. Here 
rhe margin of uncertainty is still rather small, e.g., by 2015 (i .e., 17 years from 
now) 60 percent of all cases fall into a range of about 8 million up or down from 
the median. And even the interval containing 95 percent of the assumed future 
trends is less than 20 million (or 5 percent) up or down from the median. Of cour-
se, by the middle of the next century the trumpet will have opened further and the 
95 percent interval in 2050 goes from 300 million to 413 million. 
Figure I. Total population, European Union. 
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Very different from this rather unexciting chart of total population size is Figure 
2, which shows the proportion above age 60. Here the uncertainty is not whether it 
will go up or down, but by how much the proportion of elderly will increase. 
Presently 21 percent of Europe's population is above age 60. This proportion will 
certainly increase over the coming decades because the increase is already pre-pro-
grammed in today's age structure. By 2015 even the 9 5 percent intervals show a 
very narrow range of between 24 percent and 27 percent with the median at 25.6 
percent. Still in 2030 the range of uncertainty is rather narrow, with 95 percent of 
all future paths between 29 percent and 36 percent. In other words, it can be consi-
dered virtually certain that the proportion of the European population above age 
GO will increase from its present 21 percent by 8 to 15 percentage points or on 
average to about 1.5 times its current level. This is a very significant increase by any 
standard. And the best thing about these probabilistic projections is that they can-
not be simply dismissed as ,,horror scenarios" of unknown probability. This increa-
se is virtually certain up to 2030. Thereafter, the range of uncertainty opens up 
more quickly because the influence of the already given age structure of today gra-
dually diminishes, and uncertainties related to future fertility, mortality and migra-
tion gam importance. 
The expected proportion of the population below age 20 (Figure 3) is likely to 
further decline over the coming decades, but it is not directly a mirror image of the 
proportion elderly. For the younger population the range of uncertainty opens up 
much more quickly because of the stronger direct impact of the uncertain future 
fertility rates and a smaller influence of the already existing age structure. Yet it is 
evident that with a probability of 90 percent the proportion of children and teena-
gers in Europe will decline. In the median case it declines from presently 23 per-
cent to less than 20 percent, but in the more extreme cases it could go below 15 
percent. 
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Figure 2. Proportion above age 60, European Union. 
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Figure 3. Proportion below age 20, European Union. 
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Both of these trends combined result in a significant and virtually certain 
increase in the mean age of the European population (see data in Appendix Table 
A5). It will increase from a present mean age of 39.3 years to between 42 and 48 
years by 2030 and even 41 and 52 years by 2050. The median is expected to 
increase to around 46 years. It is important to note that these data not only reflect 
the increasing number of elderly and the shrinking number of children, but they 
also indicate significant changes of the age pattern of the working-age population. 
The average age of the population of working age (20-64 years) is also expected to 
increase from 40.5 years to 43 years by 2020. Expressed in yet a different way, the 
proportion of persons aged 50-60 will increase significantly, while the younger 
members of the work force aged 20-29 will decline strongly. This is certain to have 
significant implications for the labour market and it may also have consequences 
on economic productivity as some scholars and industrialists fear. 
Figure 4. Old-age dependency ratio, European Union. 
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Another significant challenge will be faced by pension systems based on the 
transfer across different age groups. Figure 4 plots the so-called old-age dependency 
ratio, which is commonly defined as the population above age 60 divided by the 
population aged 20-60. Although the ratio does not reflect the true ratio of benefi-
ciaries to contributors in the social security system, it still gives an important indi-
cation of the underlying demographic dynamics. This ratio is presently around 38 
percent which means that there are still almost three working-age persons for one 
person above age 60. By 2040 this ratio is likely to almost double to more than 70 
percent. Already by 2018, i.e., 20 years from today, there will only be two working-
age persons for one person above age 60. This will clearly require significant adjust-
ments of the current pension systems that are, of course, based on many more para-
meters than the demographic ratios. Being aware of the fact that the issue of pen-
sions is very complex and politically sensitive, here we only want to clarify two 
points from a strictly demographic perspective. 1) It is irresponsible to limit the 
time horizon of any policy reform to 2015 or even 2010 because we already know 
that an even more significant increase will come thereafter, which is associated with 
the retirement of the baby boom generation. 2) The probabilistic projections show 
that the range of uncertainty is amazingly small over the coming decades, which 
implies that there is good hard evidence even for longer term reforms. In this con-
text, politicians cannot blame the scientists for giving them only ambiguous and 
uncertain information as they can rightly do on many other issues. 
7 .3 Sensitivity Analysis 
The projections presented above are based on the assumptions that approximately 
90 percent of all future paths in fertility and mortality and 67 percent of the paths 
in migration lie between the high and low values as assumed in the Eurostar projec-
tions. Since this assumption is based on more or less intuitive expert knowledge, it 
can rather easily be challenged by others. There is no space here to go deeply into 
the discussion of the problems associated with expert knowledge (for a very recent 
discussion of this issue, see Lee 1999; Lutz et al. 1999; Sanderson 1999) . Other 
expens or users of the projections may challenge the assumptions made as being 
either too narrow or too broad, depending on the specific views about the future 
that people may have. Generally, one may say that an underestimation of uncer-
tainty is more dangerous (one may be taken by surprise) than an overestimation 
(one cannot provide sufficiently specific information) for many of the potential 
users. For this reason, here we will compare the above results to a different set of 
projections which are based on the assumption of only 67 percent of all the future 
fertility and mortality paths falling into the range of the given high and low 
assumptions. This assumption of significantly greater uncertainty may, of course, 
seem to be an overly cautious assumption, but it is worth studying in some detail 
to determine how much it changes the results . 
• ~ ,['t~~'· ~- -~ 
6 I P. SCH R I FT E N R E I H E 
I 
Table 1 compares the resulting uncertainty ranges for the 1,000 simulations that 
are based on a 90 percent range to those based on a 67 percent range. Detailed 
information on both sets of simulations is given in the appendix tables. Here the 
figures will only be compared for selected years and selected indicators. 2015 has 
been chosen as a frequently stated year and a target year for the Eurostat projec-
tions; 2030 is the year when the baby boom generation has reached pension age 
(past age 60) and is therefore a year that deserves special attention in the context of 
population ageing. 
Table I: Uncertainty intervals (inter-fractile ranges) based on the 
assumptions of 90% and 6 7% of all future fertility and mortality 
paths lying between the high and low Eurostat assumptions. The 
figures give those intervals divided by the median in percentage 
points. 
Fraktile bei Annahme von 90% bzw. 67% Unsicherheitsbereich. 
lnter-fractile ranges 
20% 60% 95% 
2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030 
(in%) (in%) (in%) (in%) (in%) (in%) 
Total population 
90% 1.2 2.6 4.4 9.0 9.8 21.0 
67% 2.3 4.6 6.9 15.2 15.4 34.7 
Mean age 
90% 0.9 1.8 3.3 5.6 7.5 13.6 
67% 1.6 2.4 5.1 9.8 12.2 24.1 
Proportion under 20 
90% 4.3 6.1 14.3 20.9 32.8 49.2 
67% 6.7 10.2 24.5 36.7 55.5 87.7 
Old-age dependency ratio 
90% 0.6 2.6 2.0 8.7 4.7 19.0 
67% 1.4 4.5 5.2 14.2 12.6 31.3 
Table 1 shows the percentages indicating what proportion of the median value 
is covered by the stated inter-fractile range. For example, the 21 percent in the 
upper right corner of the table indicates total population size for 2030 under the 
assumption of 90 percent between the high and low values of fertility and mortali-
ty. This results in a range of 82 million persons (431-349, see appendix tables) bet-
ween the upper and lower bounds indicating the 95 percent inter-fractile range of 
the results (divided by the median of the population in 2030 (82/390=21 percent) . 
Under the assumption of 67 percent between the assumed high and low fertility 
and mortality assumptions, the corresponding value is 34.7 percent. As expected 
j ">-"1 
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the resulting uncertainty intervals become broader when assuming wider uncertain-
ty distributions for the fertility and mortality values. 
The degree of widening of the uncertainty intervals is not identical for different 
population variables and different points in time. The uncertainty range opens up 
most quickly for the future proportion of children because this is almost entirely 
dependent on future fertility levels and much less on the given age structure which 
constitutes an element of low uncertainty. Correspondingly, the mean age of the 
population has the lowest uncertainty range. While under the 90 percent assumpti-
on the 95 percent uncertainty interval is only 7.5 percent (or 3.2 years) in 2015, 
under the 67 percent assumption it increases to 12.2 percent (or 5.2 years). The 
proportion of the population above age 60 divided by that aged 20-60 (the so-cal-
led ,,old-age dependency ratio") shows a similar robustness because of the great 
influence that the already existing population structure still exerts over the coming 
decades. 
In sum, it can be concluded from this sensitivity analysis that as expected, the 
uncertainty intervals widen somewhat when only 67 percent of all future paths are 
assumed to lie between the high and low values instead of 90 percent, but this does 
not change the principal results in any way. Hence, if one wants to be on the very 
safe side, one can choose the 67 percent assumptions, but the main trends on futu-
re population ageing in Europe remain the same: a significant increase in the pro-
portion of elderly is practically certain. With respect to the time horizon, uncer-
tainty tends to be minimal over the coming two to three decades and then starts to 
increase significantly. 
7 .4 Conclusions 
This study showed clearly that massive ageing of the European population structu-
re over the coming decades is a certainty. Probabilistic population projections can 
demonstrate this fact even more convincingly than the traditional variants or scena-
rios of unspecified probability. This finding also turns out to be very robust irre-
spective of which specific model of probabilistic projection is chosen or what speci-
fic assumptions are being made with respect to the uncertainty intervals assumed 
for each of the three components fertility, mortality and migration. The main rea-
son for this robustness lies in the fact that much of the future population ageing is 
already pre-programmed in today's population age structure. 
This significant population ageing is likely to affect almost every area of society, 
the economy and even culture. It will change social institutions, political priorities, 
the relationship between generations and the relative political weight of different 
age groups. Because young citizens below a certain age do not have the right to vote 
in elections, in Europe we will soon have a majority in the electorate which is of 
retirement age or soon to be retired. The younger generations who will soon run 
our societies and will have to pay for the pensions under our pay-as-you-go pension 
schemes will become a minority. Unless appropriate mechanisms are found to give 
them a weighty voice in a structured manner, a significant potential for future 
societal conflict will be built up. This issue as well as many other structural changes 
associated with population ageing need more immediate attention by politicians 
and more resources for sound scientific analysis. The future will not simply be a 
continuation of the past, and mechanisms that proved useful in the past may not 
work in the future . Due to the special dynamics of age structural changes described 
above we still have a grace period of roughly two decades before the ageing process 
will hit Europe really hard in 2020-25 (when the baby boom generation retires). 
Shying away from reforming the pension system now because of opportunistic 
short-term political considerations and not giving increased attention to the issue 
of intergenerational equity on the micro and macro levels seem irresponsible under 
this perspective. 
The family in its various forms and dimensions will be right at the heart of 
these processes. It will be greatly affected by these demographic changes and it 
holds the key for a potential moderation or even longer term reversal of this trend 
through individual reproductive decisions which in sum make up the population's 
fertility level. At the moment most of the apparent social, cultural and economic 
forces in Europe still seem to point towards lower fertility. But the process of indi-
vidualisation, which seems to be a basic underlying determinant of this trend, can-
not go on indefinitely because human beings by their constitution are social beings. 
It is an open question, however, how far it will go and what forces and conditions 
will stop or reverse the current trend. It is surprising how little we know about this 
very important phenomenon. The conditions under which fertility may start to 
increase again have been difficult to study scientifically not only because of its int-
rinsic complexity but also because of a combination of its assumed private nature 
and the heavy ideological load it often carries. But there is no doubt that due to the 
massive expected ageing this question will receive increasing attention in the years 
to come. 
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table A I. EU total population./ Gesamtbevolkerung 
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
0.025 374.8 376.4 377.3 374.9 370.3 364.9 358.0 
0.2 374.8 377.0 380.7 381.9 381.4 379.6 376.4 
0.4 374.8 377.3 382.4 385.6 387.2 387.4 386.4 
0.6 374.8 377.6 384.0 389.0 392.3 394.2 394.9 
0.8 374.8 377.9 385.7 392.6 397.8 402.0 405.1 
0.975 374.8 378.5 389.0 399.6 408.4 416.5 423.7 
Mean 374.8 377.5 383.2 387.2 389.6 390.7 390.6 
Median 374.8 377.5 383.3 387.4 389.9 391.0 390.9 
Appendix Table A2. EU proportion above age 60. I Anteil iiber 60 Jahre 
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
0.025 0.211 0.216 0.223 0.233 0.244 0.256 0.272 
0.2 0.211 0.216 0.225 0.238 0.251 0.266 0.285 
0.4 0.211 0.216 0.226 0.240 0.254 0.271 0.293 
0.6 0.211 0.216 0227 0.242 0.258 0.276 0.300 
0.8 0.211 0.216 0.228 0.244 0.262 0.282 0.308 
0.975 0.211 0.217 0.230 0.250 0.270 0.294 0.325 
Mean 0.211 0.216 0.226 0.241 0.256 0.274 0.297 
Median 0.211 0.216 0.226 0.241 0.256 0.273 0.296 
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
348.8 337.5 323.9 308.8 292.8 
371 .6 365.2 356.5 346.2 334.7 
383.8 380.1 374.5 367.5 359.6 
394.6 393.4 390.7 386.8 381 .8 
407.6 409.2 409.2 408.5 407.0 
431.0 438.5 445.9 451.9 457.5 
389.4 387.0 383.2 378.0 371.7 
389.6 386.9 382.9 377.5 371.1 
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
0.286 0.291 0.289 0.282 0.273 
0.304 0.314 0.316 0.314 0.311 
0.313 0.326 0.331 0.333 0.332 
0.323 0.338 0.345 0.348 0.350 
0.333 0.351 0.361 0.369 0.375 
0.357 0.381 0.399 0.415 0.430 
0.319 0.333 0.339 0.343 0.344 
0.318 0.332 0.337 0.340 0.340 
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lnlerval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
0.025 0.234 0.229 0.212 0.193 0.173 0.156 0.148 
0.2 0.234 0.230 0.219 0.207 0.195 0.185 0.179 
0.4 0.234 0.230 0.222 0.214 0.206 0.200 0.194 
0.6 0.234 0.231 0.225 0.220 0.215 0.210 0.206 
0.8 0.234 0.231 0.228 0.226 0.225 0.223 0.219 
0.975 0.234 0.232 0.233 0.238 0.242 0.245 0.242 
Mean 0.234 0.230 0.223 0.217 0.210 0.204 0.199 
Median 0.234 0.230 0.223 0.217 0.210 0.205 0.200 
Appendix Table A4. EU old-age dependency ratio./ Altersbelastungsquote 
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
0.025 0.380 0.390 0.407 0.434 0.462 0.496 0.547 
0.2 0.380 0.390 0.409 0.440 0.472 0.513 0.570 
0.4 0.380 0.391 0.411 0.443 0.478 0.521 0.582 
0.6 0.380 0.391 0.412 0.446 0.483 0.529 0.594 
0.8 0.380 0.391 0.413 0.449 0.488 0.537 0.607 
0.975 0.380 0.391 0.415 0.455 0498 0.553 0.632 
Mean 0.380 0.391 0.411 0.445 0.480 0.525 0.588 
Median 0.380 0.391 0.411 0.445 0.480 0.525 0.588 
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
0.144 0.139 0.132 0.126 0.122 
0.175 0.172 0.168 0.165 0.163 
0.191 0.189 0.187 0.185 0.184 
0.203 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201 
0.216 0.217 0.218 0.220 0.221 
0.240 0.242 0.248 0.253 0.256 
0.196 0.194 0.193 0.193 0.192 
0.196 0.195 0.194 0.193 0.192 
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
0.597 0.620 0.618 0.606 0.582 
0.628 0.665 0.673 0.671 0.659 
0.647 0.689 0.704 0.710 0.708 
0.664 0.715 0.737 0.752 0.757 
0.685 0.745 0.777 0.800 0.816 
0.724 0.805 0.860 0.912 0.960 
0.657 0.705 0.727 0.738 0.742 
0.655 0.703 0.723 0.732 0.732 
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Appendix Table AS. EU mean age./ Mittleres Alter der Bevolkerung 
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
0.025 39.3 39.6 40.1 40.6 41.1 41.6 41 .9 
0.2 39.3 39.6 40.4 41 .2 41.9 42.6 43.2 
0.4 39.3 39.7 40.6 41.5 42.4 43.2 43.9 
0.6 39.3 39.7 40.7 41.7 42.8 43.7 44.6 
0.8 39.3 39.7 40.9 42.1 43.3 44 .3 45.3 
0.975 39.3 39.8 41.2 42 .8 44.3 45.7 47.0 
Mean 39.3 39.7 40.6 41 .6 42.6 43.5 44.3 
Median 39.3 39.7 40.6 41.6 42 .6 43.5 44.3 
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
42.1 42.1 41.9 41.7 41.5 
43.7 44.0 44.2 44.3 44.2 
44.5 45.0 45.4 45.7 45.8 
45.3 45 .9 46.5 46.8 47.1 
46.2 47.1 47.8 48.4 48.7 
48.3 49.5 50.7 51.7 52.4 
45.0 45.6 46.0 46.4 46.6 
44 .9 45.5 45.9 46.2 46.4 

